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Abstract
Le sche´ma ELIE de Kolm taxe les capacite´s de travail au lieu des revenus du travail
de manie`re a` e´viter les effets distortifs de la taxation sur l’offre de travail. Pourtant,
Kolm n’e´tudie pas l’impact d’ELIE sur la formation de capital human. Dans ce papier,
nous construisons un mode`le a` ge´ne´rations imbrique´es (OLG) avec agents he´te´roge`nes et
croissance endoge`ne mue par l’investissement en capital humain. Nous e´tudions l’effet de
ELIE sur l’investissement en education et sur les autres variables e´conomiques aggre´ge´es.
En calibrant le mode`le sur des donne´es franc¸aises, nous mettons en lumie`re l’arbitrage
entre croissance et redistribution. Quand le marche´ du cre´dit est parfait, ELIE arrive a`
re´duire les ine´galite´s et la pauvrete´, mais il le fait au de´triment de l’investissement en
e´ducation et de la croissance. Dans une e´conomie avec un marche´ du cre´dit imparfait
ou` les individus ne peuvent pas emprunter pour s’e´duquer, l’arbitrage entre croissance et
redistribution n’est pas renverse´, mais il est moins se´ve`re. Cependant, on arrive a` inverser
comple`tement cet arbitrage en changeant simplement la base de la taxation pour la jeune
ge´ne´ration d’une manie`re qui est e´quivalente a` subventionner l’e´ducation.
Abstract
The ELIE scheme of Kolm taxes labour capacities instead of labour income in order
to circumvent the distortionary effect of taxation on labour supply. Still, Kolm does not
study the impact of ELIE on human capital formation and investment. In this paper, we
build an overlapping generations (OLG) model with heterogenous agents and endogenous
growth driven by investment in human capital. We study the effect of ELIE on education
investment and other aggregate economic variables. Calibrating the model to French
data, we highlight a tradeoff between growth and redistribution. With a perfect credit
market, ELIE is successful in reducing inequalities and poverty, but it is at the expense
of lower investment in education and slower growth. In an economy with an imperfect
credit market where individuals cannot borrow to educate, the tradeoff between growth
and redistribution is not overturned but is less severe. However, it is possible to overturn
completely that trade-off simply by changing the base of taxation for the young generation
which is equivalent to subsidising education.
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1 Introduction
Equal Labour Income Equalisation or ELIE is a form of taxation and transfer imagined by
Kolm (2005) in his theory of macrojustice. In this scheme, labour is the only source of income.
ELIE proposes to tax labour capacities, and not labour supply in order to circumvent the
distortionary effect of taxation on labour supply.1
Kolm does not consider capital income by arguing that physical capital is itself produced
by labour, so that for macrojustice (not for microjustice) capital can be neglected. Lubrano
(2009) builds a simple neo-classical growth model a` la Solow (1956) and analyses how the ELIE
scheme reduces disposable savings and slows down physical capital accumulation. Moreover,
although capacities are at the centre of the ELIE scheme, nothing is said by Kolm about the
effect of ELIE on decisions concerning investment in human capital. When individuals can
modify their capacities and their gross wages by investing in human capital, taxing capacities
is likely to have an effect on their incentives to educate.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate what are the effects of ELIE on human capital
accumulation. We introduce the ELIE scheme in an overlapping generations (OLG) model
where heterogenous agents choose how much to invest in education when young. The initial
model comes from Azariadis and de la Croix (2006), itself based on an extension of Azariadis
and Drazen (1990) to a world with heterogeneous agents. This model has two important
characteristics. First, both growth and the income distribution are endogenous. We can
therefore study how these two variables co-move facing changes in the environment. Second,
individuals differ by their abilities, but not by their inherited wealth. Taxing labour income
will affect incentives to educate and will redistribute resources from the rich to the poor, and
not the opposite as it is the case when agents differ in their initial endowments of physical
capital, as in Garc´ıa Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2007).
In this model, we study how the ELIE scheme can influence individual decisions to invest
in education, the accumulation of human capital and income growth. We will focus on long-
run income growth and inequality without paying attention to possible losers and gainers
along the transition path. For that purpose, we will characterise the balanced growth path
of our overlapping generations model and analyse the effect of introducing an ELIE scheme
on growth and inequality.
We will first consider the effect of ELIE on inequality, education and growth in a world
where the credit market is perfect, i.e. where all individuals can freely borrow for their
educational investment. We shall then consider a situation where human capital cannot be
collateralised and where individuals cannot borrow. In this case, we expect ELIE to be less
harmful for growth by redistributing resources towards those who are constrained in their
education decision. Indeed, as stressed by Be´nabou (2005), the tradeoff between growth
and redistribution generated by a taxation scheme can depend on the availability of a credit
market. A scenario of “growth-enhancing redistribution” may seems relevant when the capital
market is less well-functioning or even unavailable. This scenario might also be relevant if the
young and old generations are taxed differently in order to subsidise education.
Government (Grant PAI P6/07 “Economic Policy and Finance in the Global Economy: Equilibrium Analysis
and Social Evaluation”). Michel Lubrano acknowledges the financial support of the ANR research project
NT05-3-41515-STAHN-Hubert: Economie de la Connaissance. We thank Cecilia Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Carine
Nourry for useful comments. Remaining errors are solely ours.
1See Cardia, Kozhaya, and Ruge-Murcia (2003) for an estimation of this distortion based on a general
equilibrium model.
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The paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The extension
to the case of an imperfect credit market is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to
the calibration and simulation of the long-run equilibrium. The tradeoff between growth and
redistribution is analysed in Section 5. The tradeoff between growth and redistribution is
overturned by a different implementation in Section 6. The last section concludes.
2 An overlapping generations model
The model is set up in discrete time, with time going from 0 to ∞. A unit of time measures
the length of a generation. At each point in time, two generations of workers are alive.
Junior workers (aged 18-39 to fix ideas), and senior workers (aged 40-62). Assuming that
individuals are born a age 18 and die at age 62, we abstract from childhood and old-age. The
complete model should include four generations. But as our main concern is the trade-off
between growth and intra-generational redistribution, we neglect for simplicity the childhood
and old-age generations. The number of individuals born at time t is Nt. At one date t, total
population includes Nt young workers and Nt−1 old workers. Young workers chose either to
work directly or to devote one part of their time to specialise with an advanced program of
education. Each young individual i born at t is endowed with one unit of time. λit is the
proportion of this time devoted to further education while 1 − λit the proportion of time
devoted to work and earn money. The tradeoff they face is therefore between studying to
improve their human capital for getting more money when old and working for getting more
money right now. Workers benefit from their further education during their second period
of life, when reaching seniority (i.e. age 40). This modeling choice reflects the idea that the
skill premium becomes much more important after 40. There is a retirement age which is
determined by a parameter ν that can be supposed to be the same for everybody and to be
constant over time. For instance if the length of a generation is 22 years and people retire
at 59, 1 − ν = (62 − 60)/22 → ν = 10/11. The use of this parameter is simply to allow for
early retirement, knowing that in France the official age of retirement is 60, while the mean
retirement age is most of the time around 59 and that workers retire at 65 in some professions.
Heterogeneity is introduced by supposing that each agent i born at time t has a different
ability. His ability vector denoted ǫit = (ǫ
Y
it , ǫ
O
it) is drawn from a distribution defined over R
2
+
(a bivariate lognormal for instance) with mean (1, 1)′ and a variance-covariance matrix Σ. ǫYit
is related to physical strength and is attached to the working ability when young. For the
same individual, ǫOit incorporates elements related to his intellectual capacities (IQ) and thus
to his ability to learn and to make education profitable when he will be old in t+1. We have
two generations living at the same time. The old generation, born at t − 1 is characterised
by a vector ǫt−1 drawn at t − 1 while the younger generation is characterised by a second
bivariate vector ǫt, drawn at t.
2.1 Human capital and growth
At each date t the old generation has an average human capital stock h¯t. Along a balanced
growth path, it is growing over time at rate g. Average human capital determines a cultural
environment from which everyone draws benefits. The stock of human capital of a member
of the young generation (say at age 18) results from the combination of his environment h¯t
2
and of his personal characteristics ǫYit
hYit = ǫ
Y
it h¯t. (1)
There are stronger and weaker individuals and that makes differences in the wage they can
earn. The wage rate per efficient unit of human capital is denoted w and it is time indepen-
dent along the balanced growth path. The difference in earnings across young individuals
results from differences in abilities ǫYit and differences in the number of hours worked 1− λit.
However, because the mean of ǫYit was supposed to be unity, the average wage rate in the
young generation is equal to w. A young individual has to decide which proportion 1− λit of
his time he will work in order to earn
(1− λit)wǫ
Y
it h¯t (2)
and which proportion λit of his time he will devote for advanced studies in order to increase
his future human capital stock at time t+ 1 when he will be old:
hOit+1 = ǫ
O
itψ(λit)h¯t. (3)
Coupled with ǫOit , ψ(λit) tells how much education can be transformed into true future capac-
ities. It will determine the expected earning in t+ 1:
νwǫOitψ(λit)h¯t. (4)
When old, the individual will earn money by working the first fraction ν of his second period
of life. He will rely on his savings for the last 1−ν part of his life.2 The function ψ is assumed
to be increasing, concave and satisfies boundary conditions
lim
λ→0
ψ′(λ) = +∞, lim
λ→1
ψ′(λ) = 0, (5)
implying that it is always optimal to spend a strictly positive time span for building human
capital.
h¯t is the average human capital of the old generation at time t (hence of individuals born
in t− 1), while the average capital stock for the next generation is
h¯t+1 =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
hOit+1. (6)
Along a balanced growth path, the growth factor, denoted by G, is constant. Using (3), we
can now characterise G as
G =
h¯t+1
h¯t
=
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
ǫOitψ(λit). (7)
In this model human capital is the sole engine of growth. Growth depends on two terms. The
first term involves the heterogenous abilities of old workers ǫOit . Thus growth depends in a
way on the results of a genetic lottery. The second term is the decision to invest in human
capital when young λit. This second factor results from the profitability of education. It can
be influenced by economic policies, taxation and redistribution.
2The parameter ν is here only to analyse the sensitivity of the model to the retirement age. The actual
period of retirement beyond 62 is not included in the model.
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2.2 Income and education decisions
Individuals have to take decisions concerning investment in education (λit), consumption c
Y
it
and saving sit. Young individuals at present time t consume c
Y
it and save sit. At future time
t + 1, they will consume cOit+1 and will not save any longer; they are not altruistic and it
is therefore optimal for them to consume all their wealth when old. Their preferences are
represented by a utility function which depends on present and future consumption only. It
has the form of:
ln cYit + β ln c
O
it+1. (8)
The old generation does not take into account the fact that the young generation benefits
from its human capital. The intergenerational transmission channel operates with (1) and is
totaly involuntary. The utility function is simple and short-sighted.
Earnings when young are devoted to consumption and saving
w(1 − λit)h
Y
it = c
Y
it + sit. (9)
When getting old, the young generation will consume cOit+1 that will be financed partially by
future labour income (in a proportion equal to ν < 1 because of early retirement age), and
partially by past savings,
cOit+1 = νwh
O
it+1 +Rsit (10)
where w is the wage per unit of human capital and R is the return on capital between the two
periods; both are constant along a balanced growth path. We now determine the life cycle
total income Ωit for the young generation:
Ωit = [(1 − λit)wǫ
Y
it + ν
w
R
ǫOitψ(λit)]h¯t. (11)
Since preferences do not depend on leisure, and as long as the capital market is perfect, the
individual decision problem is separable. We first maximise life-cycle income to determine
optimal education. Second, we maximise utility given income to determine optimal saving
and optimal consumption.
The optimal λit maximising the life cycle income is given by:
ψ′(λit) =
ǫYit
νǫOit
R. (12)
This implicit equation gives the optimal value of λit and thus represents the tradeoff between
studying and working. The opportunity cost of an additional year of education is ǫYitw while
its discounted benefit is νǫOitψ
′(λit)w/R. Up to now, in the absence of any redistribution mech-
anism, the decision of educating depends solely on the ratio between physical and intellectual
abilities and on the retirement age.
2.3 Firms
Firms produce the final good with the following CES production function:3
Yt = A(αK
−θ
t + (1− α)L
−θ
t )
−1/θ, (13)
3For more details on the algebra of the CES production function, see e.g. de la Croix and Michel (2002).
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where Kt is the stock of physical capital, Lt is the labour input in efficiency units, A is a
parameter measuring total factor productivity, α ∈ (0, 1) is related to the capital share4 and
1/(1+ θ) is the elasticity of substitution between the two factors. It is convenient for the rest
of the paper to note the production function in its intensive form, which means explaining
y = Y/L as a function of κ = K/L:
y = f(κ) = A(ακ−θ + 1− α)−1/θ. (14)
If w is the wage rate, the labour share is defined as
w
y
= 1−
α
κθ(1− α) + α
. (15)
For 1/(1 + θ) = 1, i.e. θ = 0, we have the Cobb-Douglas case with its constant labour share.
For 1/(1 + θ) < 1, i.e. θ > 0, the wage share depends positively on the evolution of the wage
rate compared to the total factor productivity. For 1/(1 + θ) > 1 and θ < 0, this is just
the reverse. A non-constant labour share might be justified for developed countries as made
apparent in Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) with an elasticity of substitution slightly greater
than 1.
We assume that capital depreciate fully after one period. The competitive behaviour of
firms leads to the equalisation of marginal productivity to prices so that the rate of return of
capital and the wage rate are given by:
R = A−θα(y/κ)(θ+1)
w = A−θ(1− α)(y)(θ+1).
The capital stock is formed by the aggregation of all savings
Kt+1 =
Nt∑
i=1
sit. (16)
Labour market clears so that labour input in efficiency units is given by:
Lt =
Nt∑
i=1
(1− λit)ǫ
Y
it h¯t +
Nt−1∑
i=1
νǫOit−1ψ(λit−1)h¯t. (17)
In this model, labour supply in efficiency units is for one part a function of personal abilities,
and is thus partly exogenous, but for the other part it results from an endogenous decision
depending on the profitability of education. The taxation redistribution ELIE scheme is
going to modify labour supply because it will alter the profitability of education for the old
generation. Let us investigate now how the ELIE scheme can be introduced and how its
potential distortional effects can be reduced by a more careful implementation.
2.4 Implementing ELIE in an OLG model
In order to have a self contained presentation, let us briefly summarise the main characteristics
of the ELIE scheme. In a given society, the ELIE scheme is a self financed distributive system
where taxes and subsidies, both denoted ti in Kolm (2005) and in this volume, balance with
4Arrow et al. (1961) call α the distribution parameter.
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∑
ti = 0 where i is an index covering all the individuals at a given period of time. An equal
amount of labour is taken from each individual imeasured in terms of his productivity while an
equal monetary amount, kw˜, is redistributed to all, so that the net transfer is ti = −k(wi−w˜).
The variable w˜ is determined so as to balance the system. k is a parameter which measures
the taxation-redistribution rate. As ELIE concerns only active age individuals, we are not
going to apply this scheme to the fraction of time 1− ν during which people are pre-retired.
In our OLG model, the modeler directly observes the working capacities of the individuals as
the vectors ǫt and ǫt−1 are exogenous and given a priori. Thus the ELIE scheme can naturally
be implemented.
The introduction of an ELIE scheme is going however to modify the incentives faced by
individuals in this economy. First, taxation of individual i is based on his labour capacities
which are partially exogenous with the observed abilities ǫYit and ǫ
O
it and partially endogenous
because there is a decision to be taken for λit, the degree of higher education. Taxation
will reduce the return on education. So the taxation basis should be chosen as carefully
as possible in order to minimise this distortion. The second aspect of ELIE is that there
is an equal redistribution to everybody. In the initial model, young people might have to
borrow in order to get supplementary education. Here, the ELIE redistribution increases the
incentives to educate by providing grants to young individuals who have a weak endowment
ǫYit of physical strength.
For the young generation, we can either decide to tax their physical strength capacity
whatever their decision of getting educated during a fraction λit of the period. Or, we can
decide to tax only the fraction of their time devoted to work and leave aside from the taxation
base the fraction of their time during which they decide to educate. This last option is a
subsidy to education. In this section, we shall present the benchmark model where the whole
capacities of the young generation are taxed. This is in a way a pure implementation of
ELIE which taxes capacities independently of labour supply decisions, here represented by
λ. Refinements and by the way more realistic cases are considered in Section 6, where in
particular we examine the consequences of using as a taxation base only the fraction of the
strength capacities that is devoted to actual work and not to education. For the simple
benchmark case, when the whole capacities are taxed taxed, the young age budget constraint
is
h¯t[(1− λit)ǫ
Y
itw − k(ǫ
Y
itw − y˜)] = c
Y
it + sit. (18)
The net transfer to a young individual i is given by:
tYit = −k(ǫ
Y
itw − y˜)h¯t. (19)
The old generation born at time t−1 also receive an identical transfer ky˜h¯t, which can be
written as ky˜Gh¯t−1. This transfer must be multiplied by ν because only active workers are
concerned by ELIE transfers. Symmetrically, only the fraction ν of their capacities is taxed.
Once they have left the labour market, old workers only consume their previous savings. There
is no taxation nor redistribution. ELIE is kept independent of any type of early retirement
system here. The budget constraint for old people born at time t− 1 writes:
νh¯t−1[ǫ
O
it−1ψ(λit−1)w − k(ǫ
O
it−1ψ(λit−1)w −Gy˜)] = c
O
it −Rsit−1. (20)
The net transfer to an old individual i is:
tOit = −k(ǫ
O
it−1ψ(λit−1)w −Gy˜)νh¯t−1. (21)
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The taxes he has to pay are a direct function of his human capital and of the decision to
educate he took in the previous period. But what he receives depends on the the level of both
y˜ and the growth rate g which are a function of past collective decisions to educate.
We have to determine the constant y˜ which will balance the budget of the system jointly
for the young born at time t and for the old born at time t− 1, because both live at time t.
This means
kh¯t

 Nt∑
i=1
(ǫYitw − y˜) + ν
Nt−1∑
i=1
(
ǫOit−1ψ(λit−1)
G
w − y˜
)
 = 0 (22)
because h¯t−1/h¯t = 1/G. As the mean of ǫ
Y
it is one, we get a simplified expression for y˜:
y˜ =
w
Nt + νNt−1

Nt + ν
G
Nt−1∑
i=1
ǫOit−1ψ(λit−1)

 . (23)
We retrieve the usual result of Kolm that y˜ is equal to the mean wage w¯ in the case of a
stationary economy (G = 1) and a degenerate ψ function with ψ(.) = 1.
2.5 Optimal education and savings with ELIE
To determine optimal education in the presence of the ELIE redistribution scheme, we max-
imise income over the life cycle as a function of λ:
max
λit
h¯t
[
(1− λit)ǫ
Y
itw − k(ǫ
Y
itw − y˜) + ν
(1− k)ǫOitψ(λit)w + kGy˜
R
]
.
Proposition 1 (Optimal education with perfect credit market)
Life cycle income of individual i is maximised for λit satisfying
ψ′(λit) =
ǫYit
νǫOit
R
1− k
. (24)
Proof. The first order condition (24) corresponds to a maximum because the function ψ(.)
is concave.
The individual choice for λ depends on his capacities, on the taxation rate k and on the
endogenous rate of return on capital. Since ψ is a concave function, education is increasing
in the ratio of IQ to strength and in the age of retirement ν, and decreasing in the tax rate
k and in the rate of return on capital r. There is thus a clear distortionary effect of ELIE
on the decision of educating. The previous case (12) can be recovered of course with k = 0.
But it can also be recovered if ν, the retirement age, is made a function of k with for instance
ν = ν˜/(1− k). Other solutions are also possible and will be studied in Section 6.
Saving is determined by young people, taking into account the old people that they will
become. It is convenient to rewrite the income of the young for the first period as
ωYit = [(1− λit)ǫ
Y
itw − k(ǫ
Y
itw − y˜)]h¯t (25)
and the income of the young when they will become old in the second period
ωOit+1 = ν[ǫ
O
itψ(λit)w − k(ǫ
O
itψ(λit)w −Gy˜)]h¯t. (26)
7
Optimal saving sit is determined by a utility maximisation under two constraints:
max log cYit + β log c
O
it+1
subject to ωYit = c
Y
it + sit
ωOit+1 = c
O
it+1 −Rsit.
The solution is given by
sit =
β
(1 + β)
ωYit −
1
R(1 + β)
ωOit+1. (27)
As usual in OLG models where individuals work during two periods, savings depends pos-
itively on income when young ωYit and negatively on the discounted income when old ω
O
it+1
(de la Croix and Michel 2002).
2.6 Equilibrium
We shall now collect the different parts of the solution in order to provide a formal definition of
the equilibrium. For that purpose, it is convenient to define the following intensive variables,
following the notations adopted for the CES production function:
ωˆYi = ω
Y
it/h¯t ωˆ
O
i = ω
O
it/h¯t sˆi = sit/h¯t
Kˆ = Kt/h¯t Lˆ = Lt/h¯t.
For defining a stationary equilibrium, we suppose that the size of the young generation Nt is
kept proportional to NY while the size of the old generation Nt−1 is kept proportional to N
O
so that their relative size is constant.
Definition 1 Given the policy parameter k, an equilibrium with a perfect credit market is
• a vector of individual variables {λi, ωˆ
Y
i , ωˆ
O
i , sˆi} satisfying for i = 1 . . . N
Y :
ωˆYi =(1− λi)ǫ
Y
i w − k(ǫ
Y
i w − y˜), (28)
ωˆOi =νǫ
O
i ψ(λi)w − νk(ǫ
O
i ψ(λi)w −Gy˜), (29)
ψ′(λi) =
ǫYi
νǫOi
R
1− k
, (30)
sˆi =
β
1 + β
ωˆYi −
1
(1 + β)R
ωˆOi . (31)
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• a vector of aggregate variables {G, y˜, Kˆ, Lˆ, κ} satisfying
G =
1
NY
NY∑
i=1
ǫOi ψ(λi), (32)
y˜ =
w
NY + νNO

NY + ν
G
NO∑
j=1
ǫOj ψ(λj)

 , (33)
Kˆ =
NY∑
i=1
sˆi
G
, (34)
Lˆ =
NY∑
i=1
(1− λi)ǫ
Y
i +
NO∑
j=1
νǫOj ψ(λj), (35)
κ =Kˆ/Lˆ. (36)
• and a vector of prices {R,w} satisfying
R =A−θα(f(κ)/κ)θ+1 (37)
w =A−θ(1− α)(f(κ))θ+1. (38)
3 Imperfect credit market
We define an imperfect credit market as an environment in which young households cannot
credibly commit their future labour income as a collateral against current loans. As in Kehoe
and Levine (1993), we assume that individuals are allowed to borrow up to the point where
they are indifferent between repaying loans and suffering market exclusion. Since everyone
dies at the end of the second period, default involves no penalty and is individually optimal.
As in this context it is optimal for them never to pay back their credits, banks will always
refuse to lend them money. The borrowing constraint then takes the very simple form: sit ≥ 0.
Let us first identify the individuals who are going to be affected by this constraint.
Proposition 2 (Earnings profile and borrowing constraint)
There exist a function Γ(ǫY , ǫO), such that individual i is credit constrained if and only if
Γ(ǫYit , ǫ
O
it) < 0. The function Γ(.) is implicitly defined by:
Γ(ǫYit , ǫ
O
it) = β(1− k − λit)ǫ
Y
it −
ν
R
(1− k)ǫOitψ(λit)−
(
νG
R
− β
)
ky˜
w
, (39)
with λit given by (24). The function Γ(.) is increasing in ǫ
Y
it and decreasing in ǫ
O
it .
Proof. The function Γ(ǫYit , ǫ
O
it) is derived from the condition sit ≥ 0 using the saving function
(27) and the definitions of incomes (25) and (26). Since λit is an increasing function of ǫ
Y
it
and a decreasing function of ǫYit , the sign of the partial derivatives of Γ are not ambiguous.
As in De Gregorio and Kim (2000) and in de la Croix and Michel (2007), households with
a steep potential earning profile would like to borrow in order to study longer, but credit
rationing prevents them from doing so. All others have positive saving and study as long as
they wish. Hence constrained individuals are those with a relative low strength and high IQ.
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Note that the threshold function Γ depends on prices through (39). For example, when
yields r are high, there will be fewer constrained households, other things being equal. Hence,
although our borrowing constraint is very simple, the proportion of rationed people depends
on equilibrium prices.
For the constrained households, Equation (24) no longer determines their education choice.
Instead, these households maximise an autarkic utility, i.e. the utility they could reach with-
out being able to use the credit market to smooth consumption. More explicitly, they choose
education in order to maximise the utility function (8) where the consumption arguments
were replaced by actual wages, with no possibility of saving: cYit = ω
Y
it and c
O
it+1 = ω
O
it+1 so
that
max
λit
ln
(
(1− λit)ǫ
Y
itw − k(ǫ
Y
itw − y˜)
)
+ β ln
(
(1− k)ǫOitψ(λit)w + kGy˜
)
+ (1 + β) ln h¯t + β ln ν.
Proposition 3 (Optimal education with imperfect credit market)
The autarkic utility of an individual i with Γ(ǫYit , ǫ
O
it) < 0 is maximised for the unique value
of λit satisfying (
1− λit − k
(
1−
y˜
ǫYitw
))
βψ′(λit) = ψ(λit) +
k
1− k
Gy˜
ǫOitw
. (40)
Proof. The left hand side of (40) is decreasing in λit, going from +∞ to 0 as λit goes from 0
to 1. The right hand side of (40) is increasing in λit. Hence there exists a unique λit equalising
these two terms.
We can now define the equilibrium with an imperfect credit market.
Definition 2 Given the policy parameter k, an equilibrium with an imperfect credit market
is
• a vector of individual variables {ωˆYi , ωˆ
O
i , λi, sˆi} satisfying for i = 1 . . . N
Y (28)-(29) and
ψ′(λi) =
[
ψ(λi) +
k
1−k
Gy˜
ǫO
i
w
]
[
β
(
1− λi − k
(
1− y˜
ǫY
i
w
))] if Γ(ǫYi , ǫOi ) < 0
=
ǫYi
νǫOi
R
1− k
if Γ(ǫYi , ǫ
O
i ) ≥ 0,
sˆi =0 if Γ(ǫ
Y
i , ǫ
O
i ) < 0
=
β
1 + β
ωˆYi −
1
1 + β
ωˆOi
R
if Γ(ǫYi , ǫ
O
i ) ≥ 0.
• a vector of aggregate variables {G, y˜, Kˆ, Lˆ, κ} satisfying (32)-(36).
• and a vector of prices {R,w} satisfying (37)-(38)
When the credit market is perfect, ELIE acts as a obstacle to the decision of educating. When
the credit market is imperfect, the ELIE scheme can help the constrained individuals in their
decision to educating. The ability of ELIE to promote education will then depend on the
proportion of constrained individuals.
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4 Numerical simulation of the equilibrium
The objective of this section is to calibrate and simulate the benchmark version of the model.
Doing so will allow us to assess the size of the tradeoff between growth and redistribution in
the perfect market case and to determine whether it is modified by the presence of borrowing
constraints (imperfect credit market).
Assumed that one period of the model is 22 years. It is then useful to define the annual
growth rate of income and the annual interest rate as:
g = G1/22 − 1, r = R1/22 − 1
4.1 A priori information
We first choose a functional form for the production function of human capital and the dis-
tribution of abilities. The production of human capital has to satisfy the two limit conditions
(5) to guarantee an interior solution for all agents. We use:
ψ(λ) = b
(
1
γ
λγ − λ
)
,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and b is a scale parameter used as a degree of freedom for calibrating the
model. In Figure 1, we have graphed this function for a range of values for γ that are within
 1
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Figure 1: Production function of human capital
the domain compatible with our calibration exercise. The scale parameter b was adjusted
accordingly to obtain a nice graph.
The psychological discount factor of individuals is set to 3% per year. As we have assumed
that one period of the model is 22 years, we have: β = 0.9722 = 0.512. The growth rate of
population n = NY /NO − 1 can be directly computed from official data which yields 1+n =
1.177.5 Finally, we have taken NY = 10000, which implies that NO = NY /1.177 = 8496.
5The total population in France is available from the Web site of INSEE
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The abilities bivariate index (ǫY , ǫO) is assumed to be distributed over a generation accord-
ing to a bivariate lognormal distribution. The usual way of obtaining a lognormal distributed
random variable is to take the exponential of a normal random variable. Let us thus consider
a bivariate normal distribution with mean µ = [µ1, µ2]
′, and variance-covariance matrix
(
σ2
O
ρ
√
σ2
Y
σ2
O
ρ
√
σ2
Y
σ2
O
σ2
O
)
= σ2
Y
.
(
1 ρ
√
σ2
O
/σ2
Y
ρ
√
σ2
O
/σ2
Y
σ2
O
/σ2
Y
)
. (41)
This matrix has three parameters: the correlation ρ and the two variances σ2
Y
and σ2
O
. The
resulting lognormal distribution has marginal means equal to exp(µi+σ
2
i ), marginal variances
equal to ς2i = (exp(σ
2
i )− 1) exp(2µi + σ
2
i ). The correlation coefficient ̺ is independent of the
means and equal to
̺ =
exp(ρσYσO)− 1√
(exp(σ2
Y
)− 1)(exp(σ2
O
)− 1)
. (42)
When ρ = 0, ̺ = 0, but when ρ 6= 0, then |̺| < |ρ|. Even if ρ is kept fixed, ̺ varies with σi. It
is convenient, for elicitation purposes, to reparametrise this matrix in σ2
Y
, ρ and the relative
variances σ2
O
/σ2
Y
. We do not have much information to calibrate this variance-covariance
matrix. The parameter σ2
Y
can be adjusted to match a measure of inequality for the observed
income distribution in France. The Gini coefficient obtained on French gross income data and
equal to 0.327 in 1998.6 This will be matched with the Gini coefficient implied by the model
(computed in Appendix A). But we have no precise procedure to calibrate the two other
parameters. It seems reasonable to assume that the ability to work when young is equally
dispersed as the ability to work when old. However, ability in youth only reflects different
endowments in efficient labour, while ability in old age also embodies the ability to accumulate
human capital. We select σ2
O
/σ2
Y
= 1 in a first step and will carry some sensitivity analysis
for σ2
O
/σ2
Y
= 1.5. The parameter ρ directly influences to proportion of types in society. With
ρ = 0, the four possible types detailed below are in equal proportion. We will take ρ = 0 as a
benchmark and we will carry sensitivity analysis for ρ = −0.9 which maximises the proportion
of the type for which education makes an important difference.
We assume that people retire at the age of 59 as reported by the OECD in 2002. This
imply that ν ≃ 10/11.
The productivity parameter b governs the long-term growth rate of output per capita.
We shall adjust it on the observed growth rate of GDP per capita that we collected from
Maddison (2007) data over the period 1981-2003. We have G = 1.44, which gives an annual
growth rate g of 1.67%. The parameter γ determines the time spent on education in the
first period of life. We shall adjust it so as to match the observed share of time devoted to
education. We assume that the first period of the model covers ages 18-39. Doing so supposes
that higher education is an alternative to working, but elementary and secondary education
is not. The percentage of time devoted to schooling is computed using Education at a Glance
from OECD (2006) (Indicator A3, page 53). We use Tertiary type A and B graduation rates
and obtain λ = 0.075.
http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/pop age2.htm, Population totale par sexe et aˆge au 1er janvier 2007, France
me´tropolitaine. From these annual data, we computed the ratio between the population born between 1960
and 1981 and the population born between 1938 and 1959. The value of this ratio is 1.177.
6This figure comes from the Human Development Report of the United Nations
http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/147.html. It can also be found elsewhere, such as in the World
Fact Book of the CIA.
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As far as technology is concerned, we borrow from Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) the
conclusion that, in developed countries, the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour adjusted human capital is of the order of 1.1 and we set θ = −0.1. From Askenasy
(2003) we take that the share of capital in value added, κ/y, is 0.35 (it fluctuates between 0.32
and 0.38 in the last 30 years). The physical capital share parameter α will we set to match this
value. We also learn from this study that the rate of return on capital in the manufacturing
sector fluctuates between 9% and 14%. We do not use this information directly but it will
serve as a benchmark to check whether our equilibrium r is in line with the data. Finally, the
scale parameter A is normalised to 1. Varying A leaves everything else unchanged provided
that we adjust α to keep the same capital share.
We now summarise the available a prior information in Table 1.
Table 1: A priori information used for calibration
σ2O/σ
2
Y ρ N
Y /NO ν κ/y β θ g λ Gini
1.0 0.0 1.177 0.91 0.35 0.512 -0.1 1.67% 0.075 0.327
1.5 0.0 1.177 0.91 0.35 0.512 -0.1 1.67% 0.075 0.327
1.0 -0.9 1.177 0.91 0.35 0.512 -0.1 1.67% 0.075 0.327
The first line is used for calibrating the benchmark model. The last two lines are used for sensitivity
analysis.
4.2 Calibration of the model
In order to impose the a priori information on growth, education and inequality, we have four
parameters of adjustment, the two parameters of the production function of human capital
ψ(λ), a scale parameter for the variance covariance matrix of the lognormal distribution σ2
Y
,
and the capital share parameter α. Given starting values for the rate of return on capital r
and the wage rate w, the model is solved iteratively using the fixed point algorithm described
in Appendix B, conditionally on initial given values for γ, b, σ2
Y
and α. As a by-product, the
model produces a vector λ, a growth rate g, an income distribution for which a Gini coefficient
is computed, and a capital share in value added κ/y. The four adjustment parameters are
then updated using the following scheme
γ = γ + (0.075 − λ¯)
b = b+ (.0167 − g)
σ2
Y
= σ2
Y
(0.327 −Gini)
α = α+ (0.35 − κ/y)
and the process is iterated until convergence is reached. We found the following solution
displayed in Table 2. The obtained rate of return on capital is 10.14% on an annual basis
which is within the range provided by Askenasy (2003).
Let us now calibrate the model with an imperfect credit market. When we keep the same
parameters, we see from the second line of Table 2 that credit rationing entails a drop in
education and growth, and incidently in inequality too. The capital share increases. In order
to make comparisons between the two cases, we have to recalibrate some of the parameters.
We recalibrate b in order to match the same growth rate as before, which requires an increase
in this coefficient to compensate for the loss of growth due to the imperfection of the credit
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Table 2: Calibration and solutions of the initial model
α γ b σ2Y r g λ Gini κ/y
Perfect credit mkt 0.475 0.456 2.387 0.204 10.14% 1.67% 0.075 0.327 0.350
Imperf. credit mkt (0) 0.475 0.456 2.387 0.204 9.94% 1.59% 0.070 0.316 0.352
Imperf. credit mkt (1) 0.475 0.456 2.421 0.223 10.02% 1.67% 0.070 0.327 0.351
Imperf. credit mkt (2) 0.475 0.456 2.431 0.204 10.04% 1.67% 0.070 0.316 0.351
Imperf. credit mkt (3) 0.473 0.503 3.027 0.211 10.02% 1.67% 0.075 0.327 0.350
In (0), no parameter is adjusted. In (1), b and σ2Y are adjusted, in (2), only b is adjusted, in (3) the four
parameters are adjusted.
market. We also recalibrate σ2
Y
to match the required level of inequality. Matching the
same growth-inequality pair in the two versions of the model allows to compare the trade-off
between growth and redistribution across them. We do not alter the parameters γ and α to
make the two models similar in this respect.
The results are reported in the line labeled (1) of Table 2. We also report a calibration
where we only adjust parameter b and leads to a similar result. In the last line of Table 2,
the one labeled (3), we report a calibration of the imperfect credit market model where we
compute the four parameters γ, b, σ2
Y
and α in order to match the four targets g, λ, Gini and
the capital share. We see that doing so requires an important rise in the elasticity of human
capital to education γ.
4.3 Heterogenous behaviour without redistribution
To better grasp the logic of the model, we distinguish four groups of individuals, depending
on their abilities ǫY when young and ǫO when old. Given the median of each marginal of the
joint distribution of (ǫY , ǫO), we classify each individual in a two by two entry table. Type 00
has a physical strength ǫY lower than the median and an intellect ǫO lower than the median.
For convenience, we call this type white collars. Type 10 has a physical strength ǫY greater
than the median and an intellect ǫO lower than the median. We call this type blue collars.
Type 01 a physical strength lower than the median and an intellect greater than the median.
We call this type academics. Finally, type 11 has a higher physical strength and a higher
intellect. We call this type managers. Table 3 presents some characteristics of these different
groups. As ρ = 0, each type represents 25% of our sample.
All types decide to educate, but according to different degrees. Types 00 and 11 choose
to educate around the mean, type 01 (academics) chooses to educate twice the mean, while
type 10 (blue collars) has the lowest decision of education. These decisions have marked
consequences. Type 10 (blue collars) are major savers because they will earn well above the
mean when young, but below the mean when old. Type 01 (academics) net saving is roughly
zero. 41% of this group borrow to finance longer education and have the prospect of earning
a very high wage when old. Notice that the group of academics will earn the minimum when
young (roughly the same as white collars), but will receive the maximum when old so that
over the life cycle their earn more than white collars. Managers and blue collars receive a
similar average income when young, but a quite different one when old.
Considering now the equilibrium with an imperfect credit market, we observe that the
academics 01 are strongly hit by the impossibility to borrow. Their education is reduced, and
their life-cycle income as well.
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Table 3: Education and saving decisions
Education Net savings Borrow. prop. Income young Life cycle income
ǫY ǫO 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Perfect credit market
(0.075) (0.017) (0.116) (0.073) (0.086)
0 0.062 0.154 0.011 0.001 0.026 0.410 0.048 0.043 0.056 0.067
1 0.021 0.063 0.032 0.023 0.000 0.027 0.102 0.098 0.107 0.115
Imperfect credit market
(0.070) (0.018) (0.000) (0.074) (0.087)
0 0.064 0.129 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.044 0.055 0.065
1 0.021 0.066 0.032 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.100 0.110 0.117
Physical strength when young is indicated in column and intelligence when old is indicated in line. The
mean value for each small two-two table is indicated between brackets. The total life cycle income for
a young individual is given by ω˜it = ω
Y
it + [(1− k)ǫ
O
itψ(λit)w + kGy˜]ν/R.
We have analysed the sensitivity of these results to the choice of ρ. Increasing correlation
up to ρ = 0.50 and recalibrating the model to fit observed growth, education and inequality,
we observe that this higher correlation between abilities greatly diminishes the proportion
of borrowers. The type proportion is changed to 0.333 (white collars and managers) and
0.167 (blue collars and academics). In this world, 33.1% of the academics borrow money for
educating which relates to an average of 7.8% in the whole economy (instead of 11.6% in the
benchmark calibration).
We do a similar exercise for σ2
O
/σ2
Y
= 1.5 while keeping ρ = 0 to investigate the robustness
of the results to different relative variances. In this case the type proportions are only very
slightly modified compared to the benchmark. 36.6% of the academics borrow money for
educating which relates to an average of 10.4% in the whole economy. Results are close to
those of the benchmark.
5 The tradeoff between growth and redistribution
We now introduce the ELIE transfer system. We do so by letting k vary between 0 and 0.40.
Let us recall that k = 0.40 means that for a working week of five days, the product of two
days is taken for redistribution. Remember that in our model both inequality and growth
are endogenous. We have seen in Proposition 1 that individual investment in education is
negatively affected by taxation k, but this was only a partial equilibrium effect, for a given
rate of return on capital. We will now investigate whether this partial equilibrium effect
carries over to the general equilibrium framework; the numerical simulation will also allow us
to quantify this effect. In section 6, we investigate how this trade-off can be overturned by a
different implementation of ELIE.
As the system balances, money is taken from some individuals and distributed to others.
If the focus of the analysis was on the life cycle of one generation in the previous section, it
has now to be on the two generations together. This means that at time t, we have to study
the interaction between young and old and detail the possible intergenerational transfers. The
ELIE transfer system has the particularity of reducing inequality in the income distribution.
We will investigate by how much does the ELIE scheme affect the Gini coefficient of young
and old incomes.
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5.1 Simulations results
Let us first analyse the impact of ELIE on macroeconomic variables, before analysing its
impact in term of inequality and poverty. First consider the case of a perfect credit market.
The impact of ELIE on the growth rate is negative as shown in Table 4. The young generation
decides to educate less and growth in our model is affected solely by the growth of human
capital. However, ELIE also decreases the proportion of young individuals that are obliged to
borrow to finance their supplementary education. The lower investment in education allows
an increasing capital labour ratio which in turn implies an increase in the wage rate per
efficient unit of human capital and a lower rate of return on capital. The decrease in the rate
of return on capital dampens the negative effect of k on the decision of education but does
not overturn it.
Considering now the imperfect credit market case, the question here is whether the nega-
tive effect of redistribution on growth via the distortion highlighted above can be overturned
by a positive effect of redistribution on growth through the easing of borrowing limits bear-
ing on poor people. The answer is no. Table 4 shows that growth is still decreasing in k,
indicating that the predominant effect is still the distortion one. But the drop in growth is
slightly less severe than in the previous case, indicating that the effect of ELIE on borrowing
limits help to limit the cost of taxation in terms of growth. If the proportion of constrained
individuals on the credit market were larger, the compensating effect of ELIE would have
been larger.
Table 4: Macroeconomic impact of ELIE
k g r λ Saving Percent. % credit Gini Headcount
(% annual) rate borrowers constr. poverty
Perfect credit market
0.0 1.67 10.14 0.075 22.88 11.63 0.00 0.327 0.281
0.1 1.52 9.95 0.069 22.86 9.28 0.00 0.295 0.242
0.2 1.35 9.73 0.063 22.85 7.04 0.00 0.264 0.195
0.3 1.15 9.48 0.056 22.83 4.99 0.00 0.232 0.143
0.4 0.91 9.19 0.050 22.82 3.39 0.00 0.200 0.082
Imperfect credit market
0.0 1.67 10.02 0.070 23.61 0.00 13.77 0.327 0.287
0.1 1.54 9.89 0.066 23.42 0.00 11.05 0.298 0.251
0.2 1.39 9.72 0.061 23.25 0.00 8.27 0.268 0.204
0.3 1.21 9.51 0.055 23.11 0.00 5.85 0.237 0.153
0.4 0.99 9.25 0.049 23.00 0.00 3.87 0.205 0.090
The right panel of Table 4 provides inequality measures for different k in the two economies.
Not surprisingly, ELIE manages to reduce inequality in the population (this is also true for
within group inequality, but inequality remains greater in the older generation.) We define a
poverty level as 60% of the mean income.7 We compute a head count measure of poverty as
7There are various ways of defining a relative poverty line. EUROSTAT defines the poverty level as 60% of
the median income. France and INSEE use 50% of the median income. The European Commission once used
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the proportion of individuals below the poverty level. Increasing k from 0.00 to 0.40 allows to
decrease poverty from 28.1% of the population to 8.2%. Comparing the model with perfect
credit market to the one with imperfect credit market, we observe that ELIE diminishes the
Gini coefficient in the same way in both cases, but is slightly less efficient at reducing poverty
when credit market is imperfect. Notice that, if one wishes to totally remove poverty, one
needs to push k as high as 0.60.
The elimination of poverty by the ELIE scheme is further illustrated in Fig. 2. We observe
that the income distribution is fairly regular and corresponds to the shape of a log-normal
distribution when there is no redistribution. The ELIE scheme shifts the whole distribution to
the right (poverty reduction), except for the extreme right tail which is dampened (inequality
reduction). We only report the graph for the perfect market case. The imperfect market case
produces a very similar graph.
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Figure 2: Income distribution with perfect credit market
5.2 Assessing the size of the tradeoff
We have seen in the previous section that increasing the value of k reduces growth but
promotes redistribution and reduces poverty. We measure inequality using a Gini index
computed on the total income distribution and poverty using the P0 index of Foster, Greer,
50% of the mean in its reports. See Atkinson (1998) for a discussion.
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and Thorbecke (1984). The importance of the trade-off between growth and redistribution is
illustrated in Fig. 3 where the graph of 1−Gini and 1− P0 against the annual growth rate is
displayed. We give this graph both when credit market is perfect and when it is imperfect.
The difference between these two cases is not negligible, but not large either. We can measure
the difference in the tradeoff by comparing the slope of the two curves. The slope with perfect
credit market is equal to -5.90, which implies that reducing the Gini by 1 point costs 0.059
in term of annual growth rate. In the imperfect market case, the slope is lower in absolute
value and equal to -5.58. The ratio of two slopes is 0.95. Hence the tradeoff between growth
and redistribution is slightly less severe with an imperfect credit market, but is far from being
overturned.
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Figure 3: Trade-off between redistribution and growth for k = 0 to k = 0.4
As far as poverty is concerned, reducing poverty by 1 point costs 0.0376 in terms of
annual growth rate. This cost drops to 0.0347 when the credit market is imperfect. Here
the ratio of the two slopes is 0.92. These numbers indicate that ELIE is quite good at
reducing poverty at a relatively low cost in terms of growth, and that this is even more true
if individuals face borrowing constraints. Still again, we are far from a case of “growth-
enhancing redistribution”, where redistribution lifts so much the credit constraints that the
de-incitative effect on growth is overturned, as suggested by Be´nabou (2005) for instance.
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5.3 The trade-off with a larger proportion of 01 type
When the credit market is imperfect, the ELIE scheme helps some poor individuals to invest
in education. These are the 01 types (the academics) who have a strong potential in terms
of future income growth but little resources when young. This is why the tradeoff between
growth and redistribution is less severe when the credit market is imperfect. But ELIE also
redistributes to the 00 types (white-collars), which is fine as far as equality is concerned, but is
of no help as far as growth is concerned. This explains why the trade-off is not modified much
when the credit market is imperfect. Unless ELIE is targeted towards the 01 households, its
effect on borrowing constraints is not strong enough to suppress its negative effect on growth.
To illustrate this point, we consider a calibration of the model with a strong negative
correlation between the two ability shocks: ρ = −0.9. In that case the economy is mostly
composed of academics and blue collars (43% of population each). Among young individuals,
ELIE will redistribute in favour of academics, without “wasting” too much resources on white
collars, who form a small 7% fraction of the population. Hence, ELIE is much more targeted
towards persons with a strong growth potential. Assuming such a strong negative correlation
is of course unrealistic, but this simulation is meant to illustrate the properties of the ELIE
scheme as a function of the type of ability distribution in the population.
We recalibrate the model with a perfect market using ρ = −0.9. This gives γ = 0.413,
b = 1.890, σ2
Y
= 0.159 and α = 0.475. The empirical correlation between the two shocks is
̺ = −0.74. We also recalibrate the model with an imperfect credit market to obtain the same
growth and inequality without ELIE (b = 1.931 and σ2
Y
= 0.188). Then we simulate various
levels of redistribution by letting k vary between 0.00 and 0.40.
The distance between the curves with perfect and imperfect credit market is now more
important. This is because ELIE is now more targeted towards 01 people and plays therefore
a greater role in alleviating the credit constraints for the individuals with a strong growth
profile. The ratio between the two slopes is now 0.87 (against 0.95) for the 1−Gini slopes and
0.81 (against 0.92) for the 1− P0 slopes.
Notice finally that the case with ρ = −0.9 is the most favourable situation to generate
a positive influence of ELIE on growth. Although we know little on the distribution of
abilities in the population, and hence the parameters of this distribution are subject to a
large uncertainty, it seems pretty clear now that no parameter configuration would be able
to reverse the tradeoff between growth and redistribution. We have to find something else.
6 How to overturn the trade-off
The original ELIE has no distortionary impact because the tax base is chosen independently
of labour supply decisions. Once we introduce a decision for educating in a two generation
model, the distortionary effect reappears. We have studied up to now the least favourable
case. We have given indications on how to reduce the distortionary effect of ELIE by an
alternative implementation. We now explore two possibilities which are equivalent to either
subsidising education in the first period or making it more profitable in the second period.
6.1 Education subsidies
The crucial decision of educating has to be taken in the first period. ELIE had a disincitative
effect on that decision, because income when senior is taxed at a proportional rate while the
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opportunity cost when young is not tax deductible (the whole physical capacity ǫYit was taken
as a basis for taxation). In doing so, we had a dogmatic vision of ELIE where the taxation
basic must be independent of labour supply decisions and thus of λ. What happens if we now
decide to apply ELIE only to the sole fraction of ǫYit that is devoted to actual work and to
exclude the fraction which is devoted to education? The taxation base is no longer ǫYit , but
(1− λit)ǫ
Y
it . The young age budget constraint is
h¯t[(1− λit)ǫ
Y
itw − k((1 − λit)ǫ
Y
itw − y˜)] = c
Y
it + sit. (43)
instead of Equation (18). The net transfer to a young individual i is now:
tYit = −k((1 − λit)ǫ
Y
itw − y˜)h¯t, (44)
replacing Equation (19) of the benchmark. As in the benchmark, they receive ky˜h¯t (while
equilibrium y˜ will be different). But in the benchmark case, they had to pay kǫYitwh¯t, while
here, they have only to contribute to the system for k(1−λit)ǫ
Y
itwh¯t. The more they educate,
the less they contribute to the system in the first period. There is thus a subsidy to educating
and implicitly a transfer from the old generation to the young generation.
Let us now determine the constant y˜ which will balance the budget of the system. Balanced
budget implies
kh¯t

 Nt∑
i=1
((1 − λit)ǫ
Y
itw − y˜) + ν
Nt−1∑
i=1
(
ǫOit−1ψ(λit−1)
G
w − y˜
) = 0 (45)
because h¯t−1/h¯t = 1/G. This implies
y˜ =
w
Nt + νNt−1

 Nt∑
i=1
(1− λit)ǫ
Y
it +
ν
G
Nt−1∑
i=1
ǫOit−1ψ(λit−1)

 . (46)
We can no longer simplify the expression using the assumption that the mean of the ǫYit is
one. To determine optimal education in this new scheme, we maximise income over the life
cycle as a function of λ:
max
λit
h¯t
[
(1− λit)ǫ
Y
itw − k((1 − λit)ǫ
Y
itw − y˜) + ν
(1− k)ǫOitψ(λit)w + kGy˜
R
]
.
The first-order condition for a maximum is given by
ψ′(λit) =
ǫYit
νǫOit
R, (47)
which is the same expression as in the case when there is no ELIE scheme (Equation (12)).
Hence, when education time is deductible from taxes, the distortionary effect of ELIE should
disappear. The implicit subsidy implied by the deductibility exactly offset the effect of the tax
bearing on future income. Compared to the benchmark, we will no longer have the distortion
on education choices; but we will have a lower transfer y˜ since the tax basis has been shrunk.
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6.2 Linking early retirement to redistribution
As an alternative to subsidising education in the first period, we can make it more profitable
in the second period, simply by increasing the early retirement age ν. Equation (24) suggests
to link this age to the intensity of redistribution by implementing
ν =
ν˜
1− k
,
where ν˜ is the retirement age in the case without ELIE scheme. Then, the optimal rule for
education (24) becomes Equation (47) again. Increasing the length of active live raises the
return on education investment. Here, by letting the retirement age increase with redistribu-
tion, we compensate the negative effect of the ELIE tax on education by increasing length of
active life and, hence, the return on education. Again here, the distortionary effect of ELIE
disappears. We are left with a rising labour supply as redistribution increases.
6.3 Numerical assessment
The two alternative efficient implementations of ELIE have clearly different macroeconomic
properties, despite the fact that they both imply the same decision function for educating.
They are not equally feasible. If subsidising education is possible whatever the value of k,
postponing retirement as a function of k can be implemented only for a small range of values
of k. Here as ν is already close to 1, this solution can work only for k ≤ 0.1.
Table 5 illustrate the macroeconomic properties of these two implementations using the
same calibration as before with a perfect credit market. We give between brackets results
for the option consisting in postponing retirement. When education is subsidised, the rate of
growth of the economy is no longer decreasing with k, but is even slightly increasing with it
(more increasing). The rate of return of capital remains more or less constant (increases) as
well as the capital share (decreases). The wage rate increases (decreases). Education slightly
increases (strongly increases). The percentage of borrowers decreases and is lower than in the
benchmark model (decreases slowly and less than in the benchmark model). The share of the
young generation in total income slightly increases (decreases). If we now look at inequality
Table 5: Macroeconomic impact of ELIE with subsidies to education
k g r λ Saving Percent. Gini Headcount
(% annual) rate borrowers total poverty
Subsidising education
0.0 1.67 10.14 0.075 22.88 11.63 0.327 0.281
0.1 1.68 10.13 0.075 22.91 9.20 0.294 0.241
0.2 1.68 10.12 0.075 22.94 6.64 0.262 0.193
0.3 1.68 10.11 0.076 22.98 4.41 0.229 0.140
0.4 1.69 10.11 0.076 23.01 2.76 0.196 0.078
Decreasing pre-retirement
0.0 1.67 10.14 0.075 22.88 11.63 0.327 0.281
0.1 1.73 10.53 0.078 22.39 10.18 0.294 0.242
and poverty, they are both slightly more reduced compared to the benchmark model. But
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postponing retirement decreases inequality less in the young generation but more in the old
generation, compared to the solution of subsidising education.
It is thus fairly possible to find an implementation of ELIE that has no distortive effect.
On the contrary, that new implementation can even be growth enhancing, even if the credit
market is perfect. The solution of subsidising education is much easier to implement and
certainly more politically feasible than postponing retirement. In the benchmark model, the
equilibrium wage rate and the pivot for redistribution y˜ are roughly equal. When education is
subsidised, w is 3.5% higher than y˜. So there is slightly less to redistribute, but in both cases w
and y˜ increase with k at exactly the same pace. Moreover, inequality in the young generation
is unaffected by subsidising education. Inequality in the old generation is significantly reduced
when education is subsidised in the first period so that overall inequality and poverty are more
reduced in that case than in the benchmark model.
7 Conclusion
The ELIE scheme of Kolm (2005) proposes to tax labour capacities instead of labour income
in order to circumvent the distortionary effect of taxation on labour supply. The question of
human capital formation and investment was not addressed by Kolm (2005), who confines his
analysis to a static world.
In this paper, we have built an overlapping generations model with heterogenous agents
and endogenous growth driven by investment in human capital. We have studied the effect of
the ELIE scheme on education investment decisions and other aggregate economic variables.
The fundamental question is to decide how to implement the ELIE scheme in this growth
model and which part of the capacities to use as a basis for taxation. Clearly, the whole
capacities can be taxed for the old generation. For the young generation, theory shows
that, ceteris paribus, ELIE has a negative effect on investment decisions in education if the
whole capacities are taxed. This effect arises because ELIE taxes future labour income,
which reduces the return to investment in human capital. The distortionary effect of ELIE is
completely overturned if the part of the capacities that are used for financing education are
taken out of the tax base. This is a form of subsidy to education.
Calibrating the model on French data, we illustrate the traditional trade-off between
growth and inequality when the whole capacities are taxed. In its crude implementation,
ELIE is successful at reducing inequality and poverty, but at the expense of a lower investment
in education and a slower growth rate. In a world with an imperfect market where individuals
cannot borrow to educate in the first period, the tradeoff between growth and redistribution is
modified. Indeed, in such a world, ELIE helps poor students to finance their education which
counteracts partly its negative effect on the return to education. But since ELIE redistributes
to all poor people, and not only to those with a strong growth potential, the beneficial effect
of ELIE obtained by lifting borrowing constraints is quantitatively small.
Using an alternative implementation of ELIE, growth can remain constant while inequality
is reduced. This variant of the model, calibrated on French data, shows that education has
to be subsidised if we want to escape from the traditional trade-off between growth and
redistribution. Moreover, the usual argument according to which students should pay high
fees at the university because those fees are partly compensated by their discounted future
earnings is wrong. Our model shows that when there is redistribution, high fees have a
disincitative effect on education decisions. And it also shows that subsidising education when
22
there is redistribution enhance growth and reduces inequality in a better way.
Appendix A. Model’s income distribution
We give here the formula to derive the net income distribution of the population living at
time t. It is formed by the concatenation of the vector of income of the young generation
and of the vector of income of the old generation living at the same time. For the young
generation the budget constraint gives:
ωYi = (1− λi)ε
Y
i w − k(ǫ
Y
i w − y˜) for i = 1...N
Y .
For the old generation, the net income is, still up to the multiplicative factor h¯t, established
for the working part of that generation given by the budget constraint (20)
ωOj = [ǫ
O
j ψ(λj)w − k(ǫ
O
j ψ(λj)w −Gy˜)]/G for j = 1...N
O.
Taking into account that ht−1 = ht/G. The net income distribution is thus given by:
ω′ =
[(
[ωYi ]
NY
i=1
)
′
,
(
[ωOj ]
NO
j=1
)
′
]
.
The income distribution is computed for the age group 18-62. Accordingly, the relevant
income of the old generation is here ωOit , and ν does not enter this formula, contrary to (20).
We compute the Gini coefficient for ω.
Appendix B. Numerical methods
The model is solved using a traditional fixed point algorithm. We give below the procedure
to compute the equilibrium with credit constraints for given parameters. The case without
constraints is just a simplification of this more complicated case. We first have to fix starting
values for the aggregate variables r, w and y˜. Then we apply the following algorithm.
- Step 1 identify constrained agents running (39) for the first generation using ǫt, store
the results in id1. Do the same for the second generation using ǫt−1 and store the result
in id2.
- Step 2
– compute the optimal λ using (24)
– compute the constrained optimal λc solving (40) using a fixed point algorithm
– λj = idjλ+ (1− idj)λc for j = 1, 2.
- Step 3 compute the growth rate g, the different income and transfers vectors, and the
vector of savings. Deduce K, L, r, w and y˜.
- Step 4 Check the change in λ1 and y˜. If the sum of the absolute changes is greater
than 10−6, go to step 1. Otherwise deliver the needed vectors and equilibrium values.
In the unconstrained case, step 1 does not exist and step 2 does not involve computing
λc.
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